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The European Union needs to pay close attention to the risks and the potential 
benefits of a greater engagement in maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Against 
the backdrop of a crowded, unstable and increasingly militarized maritime space, 
this Policy Brief provides an overview of the main aspects that future EU policy 
planning on maritime security in the Indian Ocean must address. It outlines important 
recent developments in the region and discusses their specific implications for the 
EU as a maritime actor: What exactly is the European Union currently doing in this 
field, what are its main interests, and how can the EU effectively protect them without 
antagonizing its traditional security partners or adding fuel to an already tense 
situation of maritime insecurity?
Geopolitics and Maritime 
Security in the Indian Ocean
What Role for the European Union?
AUGUST 2014
Introduction*
As geopolitical power shifts from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific, policy-makers in the European 
Union (EU) ought to pay closer attention to 
the vast maritime region that lies in between: 
the Indian Ocean. All major powers rely on 
the so-called Great Connector that stretches 
from the Cape of Good Hope to the Strait of 
Malacca. The rising economies of East Asia 
are acquiring more and more purchasing 
power and need to secure increasing energy 
needs. This affects the vital sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean, 
especially those along the strategic choke 
points in the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait 
of Bab-el-Mandeb. These are becoming 
increasingly packed with cargo ships, oil 
tankers and patrolling navy vessels.
Actors such as the EU and its member states, 
China, India, the United States, Japan and 
Australia are steadily increasing their naval 
presence and their military capabilities in 
the Indian Ocean and in various strategic 
positions along its rim. Smaller naval powers 
such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore 
and South Korea are also expanding their 
activities in the region. The absence of 
a comprehensive multilateral agreement 
on maritime security in the Indian Ocean 
makes this force projection dynamic highly 
problematic. It bears the trademarks of a 
classical security dilemma. Many actors 
* This is a joint policy brief of The Hague Institute 
for Global Justice and the Clingendael Institute. 
The authors are grateful for the helpful comments 
of Barend ter Haar, Micha’el Tanchum, Bibi van 
Ginkel, Joris Larik and Richard Ponzio on draft 
versions of this paper.
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harbour suspicions about the others’ ulterior 
motives and quietly mobilize for rougher 
times.
Moreover, many countries in this region 
are politically unstable. This has given rise 
to non-conventional security challenges in 
the Indian Ocean such as piracy, human 
and drug trafficking, as well as maritime 
terrorism. The precarious security situation 
along the Horn of Africa is particularly 
noteworthy in this regard. Violent insur-
gencies are commonplace and threaten the 
political stability of the entire region. The 
World Food Program (WFP) recently reported 
‘over 400,000 internally displaced persons 
and war-affected individuals in Yemen’s 
northern region’ (WFP, 2013: 152) alone. 
As the sources of insecurity for ordinary 
citizens are so profound, some people have 
turned to the adjacent high seas to secure an 
illicit income through piracy. The European 
Union and many other maritime actors have 
responded to this challenge and managed 
to contain the risk of piracy quite effectively. 
Still, the threat is by no means extinguished 
and other non-conventional security 
threats, such as maritime terrorism and the 
trafficking of goods and people, merit the 
continuing engagement by the EU and other 
international actors.
Sources of Insecurity in the 
Indian Ocean
There are currently two main sources of 
insecurity in the Indian Ocean. The first 
is instability in some of the littoral and 
Indian Ocean
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hinterland states around the Indian Ocean 
(Potgieter 2012). This also relates to sea-
based terrorist activities and maritime piracy. 
With regard to terrorism, prominent incidents 
include attacks by al-Qaeda on a US warship 
in 2000, and on a French tanker in 2002 
(Winner, Schneider and Weldemichael, 
2012: 107). In the field of maritime piracy, 
much attention has been drawn by piracy in 
the Malacca Straits (especially up to 2005) 
and Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden and 
the Western Indian Ocean (since 2008 in 
particular; Van Ginkel and van der Putten, 
2010). To a certain degree, both sea-based 
terrorism and maritime piracy threaten the 
security of international shipping in the 
Indian Ocean. Moreover, sea-based terrorism 
can also be aimed against targets on land. 
The ’26/11’ Mumbai attacks in 2008 are a 
dramatic illustration of this.
The other main source of insecurity relates 
to the rise of new naval powers in the Indian 
Ocean. While piracy and terrorism in the 
Indian Ocean are current issues, so-called 
Great Power rivalry is not yet an immediate 
security threat in the region. However, the 
potential effects of Great Power rivalry are 
more fundamental and reach further than 
acts of terrorism or piracy. In terms of this 
rivalry, two major issues stand out. The first 
is increasing maritime rivalry between India 
and China. Tensions between these two 
Asian powers have existed since the 1959 
exile of the Dalai Lama to India, and the 1962 
Sino–Indian border war. Moreover, China is 
a close security partner of Pakistan, which 
traditionally has a troubled relationship 
with India. Now that China and India are 
emerging as major powers, the Indian 
Ocean has become an additional area of 
potential tensions between the two. This 
is especially the case since 2009, when 
the Chinese navy started operations in 
the Indian Ocean in response to Somali 
piracy. For this purpose, China has so far 
maintained a continuous naval presence 
in the Gulf of Aden, on a rotating basis, 
with task forces consisting of two warships 
and one supply vessel. The warships carry 
Chinese special forces, which can provide 
onboard protection for commercial vessels. 
China has so far dispatched seventeen 
consecutive counter-piracy task forces to 
the Gulf of Aden.1 Meanwhile, the steady 
rise of India as an economic power provides 
it with a growing capacity to play a role 
in the maritime domain. The Indian navy 
commenced counter-piracy operations in 
the Gulf of Aden in 2008,2 and is speeding 
up its modernization and expansion of 
its capabilities in the maritime domain. 
The recent Indian purchase of twelve 
P-81 anti-submarine warfare aircraft from 
the United States is illustrative of this 
(Tanchum, 2014).
The Chinese navy operates without bases 
in the region. Instead, Chinese navy ships 
are replenished through visits to various 
commercial ports around the western Indian 
Ocean. Logistical support at the local level is 
provided by Chinese companies (Kamerling 
and van der Putten, 2011b). Nonetheless, 
India seems concerned about the possibility 
of an increased Chinese naval presence in 
the future at sea and in places such as the 
Seychelles, which are often mentioned in 
international media as a potential location 
for a Chinese naval supply facility.3 Moreover, 
China has close diplomatic and economic 
ties with a large number of littoral states 
in East Africa, the Middle East, South 
Asia, and South-East Asia. China has sold 
arms to many of these nations, and has 
invested in port construction in countries 
such as Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh. Chinese shipping firms and 
commercial port operators are highly active 
in and along the Indian Ocean, and Chinese 
fishing and offshore oil and gas activities 
in the region are also increasing. India’s 
efforts to expand its navy and its ties with 
other littoral states are driven in part by the 
aim of keeping up with the growing Chinese 
presence in Indian Ocean. China’s range of 






courts-seychelles/?page=all. The Maldives 
have also been mentioned by some media 
as a potential host for a Chinese base; see 
http:// www. wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-
cnt.aspx?id=20140513000090&cid=1101.
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maritime activity extends even further west 
than the Indian Ocean. In 2011, a Chinese 
warship was present in the Mediterranean 
Sea to assist in the evacuation of Chinese 
citizens from Libya during its civil war. 
A Chinese state-owned company, Cosco, 
is currently engaged in container port 
management in Greece (Van der Putten, 
2014), and in the eastern Mediterranean the 
Chinese navy is escorting ships engaged in 
the chemical disarmament of Syria, operating 
from Cyprus.
The Risk of Tensions Spilling 
Over from the Pacific Ocean
The second major instance of potential 
Great Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean 
relates to the risk of spillover effects from 
maritime tensions in the western Pacific 
Ocean, including the East and South China 
Seas (Sweijs 2010). Competition for regional 
leadership in East and South-East Asia 
between China and the United States is 
increasingly manifesting itself in maritime 
security issues. The zones of prime strategic 
importance of China and the United States 
overlap in the East and South China Seas. 
The United States maintains a significant 
military presence in Japan and South Korea, 
with which it has security alliances. This 
presence includes the Japan-based Seventh 
Fleet. Other US security allies and partners 
in East and South-East Asia include the 
Philippines, Thailand,4 Singapore and Taiwan. 
The United States has also strengthened 
its security cooperation with Vietnam and 
Indonesia.
In recent years the United States has 
responded to China’s rising influence by 
strengthening its military, diplomatic and 
economic efforts throughout the region. 
Closely intertwined with the Sino–US rivalry 
are security tensions between China and 
Japan. To an important degree, these revolve 
around conflicting territorial claims in the 
East China Sea, and Chinese naval activity 
close to Japanese territory. Given the role 
of the United States as Japan’s ally and 
the heavy US military presence in Japan, 
the Sino–Japanese security relationship 
cannot be seen as separate from the 
Sino–US relationship. This high degree of 
interconnectedness relates also to the South 
China Sea. On the one hand, the supply lines 
of Japan and other US security partners are 
vulnerable to China’s military influence in the 
South China Sea. On the other hand, China’s 
own supply lines crossing the very same 
region are vulnerable to the military influence 
of the United States. In the South China Sea, 
4 In May 2014, the United States responded to a 
military coup in Thailand by limiting cooperation 
with the Thai military.
The EU’s counterpiracy mission ‘Operation Atalanta’ off the coast of Somalia has been active 
since 2008. Photo: European Union Naval Force.
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the US is indirectly involved in a territorial 
dispute between its ally, the Philippines, and 
China.
Although the US navy recently began 
stationing warships in Singapore, there 
have been no major signs so far that the 
maritime tensions in the East and South 
China seas are spilling over into the Indian 
Ocean. Nevertheless, not only China but also 
the US and Japan have a naval presence in 
the Indian Ocean. For decades, the United 
States has been the leading naval power 
in this region, with a military presence in 
the Persian Gulf and on the small island 
of Diego Garcia. During the 1990s, the US 
strengthened its naval presence in the region 
by establishing the Bahrain-based Fifth 
Fleet, which comprises an aircraft carrier 
strike group and multiple other task forces. 
The United States also oversees several 
combined naval task forces in the Indian 
Ocean, in which allies and security partners 
of the US participate. In addition, the US also 
has a presence through the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). One of the 
Combined Maritime Taskforces (CTF151) and 
a NATO naval operation (Ocean Shield) are 
aimed at counter-piracy operations in the 
Gulf of Aden.
The current Japanese naval presence in 
the Indian Ocean dates from 2001, when 
the Japanese navy (known as the Japan 
Maritime Self-Defence Force or JMSDF) 
commenced missions in the Indian Ocean 
under Operation Enduring Freedom–
Maritime Interdiction Operation, a part of the 
US-led war on terror (Yoshihara and Holmes, 
2011: 20). Until 2010, the JMSDF sent tankers 
to supply ships of the US-led coalition forces 
engaged in Afghanistan, as well as warships 
to join in operations to interdict weapons and 
drugs. Since 2009, the Japanese navy has 
been engaged in counter-piracy operations 
in the Gulf of Aden. The following year, the 
Japanese military established a de facto 
base in Djibouti to support its counter-piracy 
activities (Kato, 2011), which are carried out 




Although the United States, China, India and 
Japan all have a continuous naval presence 
in the western Indian Ocean, at present it 
seems unlikely that there will be a major 
naval arms race in that maritime region. 
While the United States is firmly entrenched 
and India is the emerging regional power 
(India International Centre 2011), in the 
short term neither China nor Japan are likely 
to have major force projection capabilities 
west of the Malacca Straits. Japan’s military 
is constitutionally bound to focus on the 
defence of its own territory. Should Japan 
change (or re-interpret) its constitution 
in order to allow for collective defence, it 
would likely remain dependent on the United 
States to protect its supply lines in the Indian 
Ocean. China, on the other hand, does not 
yet have the military capabilities to be a 
dominant naval power in the Indian Ocean. 
Moreover, as pointed out by Chinese scholar 
Chu Shulong, in this context it would be futile 
for China to attempt to make its maritime 
supply routes across the Indian Ocean 
invulnerable to a blockade by the US navy.6 
Moreover, given China’s long-standing policy 
of not establishing military bases abroad, it is 
possible that this will indeed remain the case 
in the Indian Ocean region in the near future. 
Still, China has major interests in the region, 
in particular its access to raw materials in 
the Middle East and Africa, and to markets 
there and in Europe. Beijing may therefore 
be expected to continue its present policy of 
building up strong diplomatic and economic 
influence throughout the Indian Ocean’s 
littoral states. It is also likely that the Chinese 
military will continue to develop its regional 
presence in the sphere of non-traditional 
security. In the past two decades, China has 
participated in UN Peacekeeping Missions by 
sending non-combat troops. China recently 
upgraded its involvement in African peace 
operations by dispatching security forces 
tasked with protecting the UN mission’s 
headquarters in Mali.
6 Presentation at the symposium on the EU as 
a maritime security actor in the Indian Ocean, 
organized by The Hague Institute, Clingendael and 
BICCS, The Hague, 15 April 2013.
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Interests and Involvement of 
the EU
The main risk for the EU in the longer term is 
that potential Great Power rivalry affects the 
Indian Ocean region to such an extent that 
it (further) destabilizes regions in Africa and 
the Middle East, or that it leads to instability 
and increased tensions in the Mediterranean 
region. Unfortunately there is at present 
no effective mechanism for multilateral 
cooperation on maritime security in the 
Indian Ocean (Cordner 2011; Potgieter 2012). 
The UN Security Council – being dominated 
by the Great Powers – is unable to address 
the increase of Great Power rivalry in the 
western Pacific, and it is also unlikely to be 
able to deal with such rivalry in the Indian 
Ocean. The Indian Ocean Rim Association for 
Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) is aimed at 
economic rather than security cooperation, 
and is organizationally weak. The most 
relevant forum is currently the Indian Ocean 
Naval Symposium (IONS), which is an Indian 
initiative that brings together the naval 
chiefs of a large number of littoral countries 
(Cordner 2011). Extra-regional countries like 
China and Japan do not take part in this, 
despite their presence in the region. There 
also is an ad-hoc grouping of countries and 
actors that are involved in combating Somali 
piracy: the Contact Group on Piracy off 
the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). However, a 
mechanism similar to the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF; which is aimed at South-East 
and East Asia) – with annual meetings at 
the ministerial level that explicitly address 
maritime security issues and that involve 
both regional countries and extra-regional 
major powers – is lacking in the Indian 
Ocean.
The European Union and its member states 
are currently active with regard to maritime 
security in the Indian Ocean in a number 
of ways. The EU participates in counter-
piracy efforts related to Somalia-based 
piracy. This includes not just the EU naval 
mission Atalanta (Larik, 2014), but also the 
EU’s participation in the naval coordinating 
meetings in Bahrain (Shared Awareness and 
Deconfliction, or SHADE) and various other 
efforts to address Somali piracy. Moreover, 
EU member states cooperate with the United 
States with regard to counter-terrorism 
and international missions in Afghanistan, 
through maintaining a naval presence under 
NATO as well as directly in cooperation 
with the US. France maintains naval bases 
in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates. 
Seven EU member states (Bulgaria, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and 
Romania) are members of the UN Ad-Hoc 
Committee on the Indian Ocean, which 
was established in 1971 to prevent Great 
Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean in order to 
enhance peace and stability in the region.7 
The ad-hoc committee’s establishment 
followed on from the UN General Assembly’s 
1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as 
a Zone of Peace, which called upon the 
Great Powers to halt ‘the further escalation 
and expansion of their military presence 
in the Indian Ocean’. It also called for the 
establishment of a ‘system of universal 
collective security’.8 The ad-hoc committee 
is aimed at studying which measures may 
be taken to further the objectives of the 
Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of 
Peace. This committee still exists, although 
it currently appears to have made little 
progress since its establishment.9
The EU’s main interests regarding maritime 
security in the Indian Ocean region include 
unhindered and safe passage of goods. 
As a major actor in global trade, the EU 
relies heavily on the SLOCs in the Indian 
Ocean. It has a tremendous interest in 
securing the trade routes for its exported 
or imported goods, in addition to which it 
also has an interest in protecting European 
fishing activities in the Indian Ocean. The 
non-conventional security challenges are 
an obvious threat to safe passage, but by 
no means the only one. Arguably, it is the 
absence of a comprehensive multilateral 
agreement on maritime security in the Indian 
Ocean that is potentially risky for business 
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primary interest to focus its long-term 
planning on effective multi-level advocacy 
for a comprehensive multilateral agreement 
on maritime security in the Indian Ocean. 
All key stakeholders would need to come to 
an agreement on how to ensure maritime 
security collectively in the common space 
of the Indian Ocean. Rigorous, impartial 
monitoring could then help to overcome the 
basic security dilemma.
The EU also has a strong interest in stability 
and security in its immediate environment 
– the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle 
East and North Africa – which overlaps 
with the north-western part of the Indian 
Ocean region (see also Holslag 2013). The 
countries on the Indian Ocean’s rim host 
40 per cent of the world’s population. Some 
of those countries are politically instable, 
and poverty and inequality is widespread 
across the region. Over the past decade, 
the Indian Ocean has become a hotbed for 
illicit trade, piracy, illegal trafficking of people 
and drugs, as well as maritime terrorism. 
Multilateral cooperation to counter these 
non-conventional security threats has made 
progress in recent years. For example, the 
EU played a significant role in successful 
anti-piracy missions. Its commitment to 
countering piracy in the Horn of Africa, in 
particular, increased the EU’s credibility as 
an important actor in maritime security in 
the Indian Ocean.10 The EU should maintain 
and intensify its current level of engagement. 
More importantly, it should start harnessing 
the experience of good cooperation 
between major stakeholders – including 
both regional states and countries such as 
China, India, the United States, Japan and 
Australia – in countering non-conventional 
security threats with more comprehensive 
security cooperation that would address 
inter-state collective security and equitable 
burden-sharing for its protection. A better 
understanding of the current and future 
ambitions of the key maritime players in the 
Indian Ocean is crucial in this regard.
10 On the EU’s counter-piracy mission and potential 
for cooperation in this regard with China and other 
Asian actors, see Kamerling and van der Putten, 
2011a and 2010; and Larik and Weiler, 2011.
Implications
For the EU, 2014 is a potentially decisive 
year to push forward its engagement with 
emerging naval actors and its priorities on 
the maritime security agenda. It adopted an 
EU Maritime Security Strategy (EMSS) to 
be further refined with a follow-up Action 
Plan by the Italian presidency in the second 
half of 2014.11 Also, it currently chairs the 
CGPCS, and has become a member of the 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific (CSCAP), a track-II diplomacy forum 
that is intended for the exchange of ideas 
on security cooperation and governance in 
East Asia.
The European Union has to tread carefully 
when advancing collective maritime security 
in the increasingly securitized common 
space of the Indian Ocean. It has limited 
resources and must opt for smart policies 
that will not strain the defence budgets of its 
member states too much. Deploying further 
EU naval forces is costly and difficult to sell 
in times of austerity. Plus, it may also be 
counterproductive in overcoming the basic 
security dilemma. Working relentlessly with 
all partners for comprehensive international 
security cooperation appears, therefore, to 
be the far better alternative. Many actors 
in the Indian Ocean are publicly calling for 
an improved security dialogue but – thus 
far – this has not amounted to anything 
substantive in political practice. Naturally, 
the devil is in the detail, and maritime 
security in the Indian Ocean remains 
essentially contested among China, India and 
the United States. Some policy differences 
might be very difficult to overcome. In any 
event, it will take a substantial political and 
potentially financial commitment from all 
sides to put this vision into practice. Still, 
the EU has some leverage here as a major 
trading partner of China and major security 
partner of the United States. Also, because 
of its soft power approach with a focus on 
international law, the EU – compared with 
other maritime powers – may be the more 
acceptable partner for many countries in 
11 Bulletin Quotidien Europe 11110, 28 June 2014; and 
European Commission, 2014.
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the region to cooperate with and to take 
action in matters of shared concern. Exactly 
because many Asian actors do not see the 
EU as a strong (hard) security player, the EU 
has some room to manoeuvre in initiating a 
maritime security governance mechanism 
or framework that can mitigate the risk of 
the Indian Ocean being affected by Great 
Power tensions. It should not overplay its 
role however, and should work in close 
cooperation and coordination with regional 
countries.
The EU has a strong interest in promoting 
international law (such as UNCLOS) as the 
basis for maritime governance and ensuring 
that the maritime security agenda in the 
Indian Ocean is not solely determined by 
major powers such as China, India and 
the United States. In addition to working 
with these Great Powers, the EU should 
coordinate its position and lobbying 
efforts closely with the littoral states, 
including Australia. It should also explore 
possibilities to intensify its efforts through 
the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), which is a key partner when 
it comes to preventing the spillover of 
geopolitical tensions in East Asia into the 
Indian Ocean region. Finally, the EU needs 
to master a delicate balancing act. How to 
protect its interests without antagonizing 
China or the United States? On the one hand, 
the EU might see a stronger commitment 
to maritime security in the Indian Ocean 
as a means to strengthen its transatlantic 
security relationship with the United States. 
The US pivot, or rebalance, towards Asia 
has underlined the need for Europe to 
take a greater responsibility for stability in 
its immediate surroundings, including the 
Mediterranean and western Indian Ocean 
littoral states. At the same time, the EU’s 
interests do not necessarily always converge 
with those of the United States, and the EU 
benefits from taking a more independent 
position on security issues related to Asia. 
The European Union should therefore make 
sure that it takes the lead as a security 
partner in cooperating with naval newcomers 
that operate close to or in Europe’s maritime 
backyard – that is, the Mediterranean 
and its approaches in the north-western 
Indian Ocean. This should be seen as an 
opportunity in shaping security partnerships 
and moulding the experiences and lessons 
learnt that these actors take home with them.
Policy Recommendations for the 
European Union
– In its public statements, the EU should 
consistently express that it regards 
maritime security in the Indian Ocean 
region as a necessary precondition 
to the security of vital sea lanes of 
communication and to security and 
stability in its immediate environment: 
the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East 
and North Africa. The EU should also 
make clear that it wants to play an active 
and long-term role as a contributor 
to maritime security in the Indian 
Ocean region, and that it regards the 
risk of emerging Great Power rivalry – 
particularly in combination with instability 
in the littoral states – as a fundamental 
threat to security in the Indian Ocean 
region.
– The Action Plan that will follow up the 
EU Maritime Security Strategy should 
be more outspoken on the international 
partners it wants to further engage with 
in maritime security. The focus in building 
partnerships should be on relevant 
littoral states and naval newcomers in the 
maritime areas of interest in the Indian 
Ocean and beyond. Creating synergies 
with the EU’s Strategic Partnerships 
especially in Asia – in which maritime 
security is also highlighted – adds further 
value. The Action Plan should also lay out 
concrete ideas on how to build further on 
the ‘rules-based ocean governance’ and 
maritime multilateralism that the EU aims 
to promote.
– The EU should take the initiative to 
work with the Indian Ocean’s littoral 
states to establish a track-II platform 
comparable to the CSCAP for dialogue 
on maritime security in the Indian 
Ocean region between academics and 
former diplomats and military personnel. 
Individual EU members states with 
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a strong interest in maritime affairs 
– including the Netherlands – should 
consider taking the lead in getting such 
an initiative off the ground. Moreover, the 
main extra-regional maritime powers – in 
particular the United States, China and 
Japan – should be encouraged to join 
this initiative, as well as maritime industry 
associations and non-governmental 
organizations. This forum could then 
undertake the groundwork for preparing 
frameworks and mechanisms for 
cooperation that are acceptable to all 
actors involved in the region. More low-
profile technical assistance and the 
sharing of expertise on less-sensitive 
issues such as maritime judicial issues, 
ocean resources, fisheries policies and 
environmental concerns could also be a 
good starting point.
– In the longer run, the EU should follow up 
on this by working with littoral countries 
to establish a new forum for maritime 
security issues in the Indian Ocean 
region. This could be structured around 
an annual gathering of the ministers 
of foreign affairs of its member states, 
similar to ARF (Cordner 2011). Here, too, 
major extra-regional maritime powers 
– such as the United States, China and 
Japan – should be encouraged to join. 
The EU should be represented through 
the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and aim at cooperation on both 
traditional and non-traditional security 
issues. As such, it should coordinate 
closely with existing multilateral security 
initiatives such as the UN Ad-Hoc 
Committee on the Indian Ocean and the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast 
of Somalia. It should also coordinate 
with the IOR-ARC and the IONS, as well 
as (sub-)regional organizations such 
as the African Union, the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), and NATO. This type 
of security cooperation should reduce 
mistrust and threat perceptions among 
actors, and strengthen security dialogue 
and constructive diplomacy.
Abbreviations Used in this 
Policy Brief
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of South-East 
Asian Nations
AU African Union
CGPCS Contact Group on Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia
CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation 
in the Asia Pacific
EMSS EU Maritime Security Strategy
EU European Union
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
IONS Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
IOR-ARC Indian Ocean Rim Association for 
Regional Cooperation
IMO International Maritime 
Organization
JMSDF Japan Maritime Self-Defence 
Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization
SAARC South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation
SHADE Shared Awareness and 
Deconfliction
SLOC Sea line of communication
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Seas
US United States
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